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Abstract
Political campaigns involve, in the simplest case, two competing campaign groups which try to
obtain a majority of votes. We propose a novel mathematical framework to study political cam-
paign dynamics on social networks whose constituents are either political activists or persuadable
individuals. Activists are convinced and do not change their opinion and they are able to move
around in the social network to motivate persuadable individuals to vote according to their opinion.
We describe the influence of the complex interplay between the number of activists, political clout,
budgets, and campaign costs on the campaign result. We also identify situations where the choice
of one campaign group to send a certain number of activists already pre-determines their victory.
Moreover, we show that a candidate’s advantage in terms of political clout can overcome a sub-
stantial budget disadvantage or a lower number of activists, as illustrated by the US presidential
election 2016.
∗ lucasb@ethz.ch
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INTRODUCTION
Due to the advancement of network science, it has become possible to incorporate the
salient features of opinion formation and spreading into large-scale network models [1–7].
The study of political mobilization is one example of such opinion dynamics, which allowed
remarkable observations such as the identification of universal features in elections [8], the
importance of easily persuadable individuals for opinion cascades [9], the impact of online
social influence [10] and the necessity of social reinforcement in order to convince people
[11–13].
In recent years, political mobilization and the associated campaigns became more and
more sophisticated due to online social media, the availability of data on personal prefer-
ences and the huge financial campaign support1 [14, 15]. Still, the influence of campaign
characteristics such as the number of political activists, political clout or the size of the cam-
paign budget on actual outcomes is not well understood. A more profound understanding
of political campaigns is necessary to appropriately interpret the corresponding outcomes
and to possibly redesign certain aspects of campaign policies [16]. Thus, we propose a
novel mathematical framework to describe political campaign dynamics on networks. More
specifically, we account for the fact that mobile political activists can convince persuadable
individuals under certain efficiency and cost restrictions. We demonstrate the existence of
one unique stationary solution and rigorously describe the interplay between activists, polit-
ical clout, budgets and campaign costs on this state, thereby understanding how candidates
can win elections. We find that a given budget might allow different choices of the number
of activists, such that campaign groups find themselves in an activist-choice game. In these
strategic situations, a campaign group chooses activists as a best response to the choice of
the other campaign group, which may be crucial for winning the election. Interestingly,
some activist combinations lead to strong competition and thus to a large campaign budget.
Furthermore, an advantage in terms of political clout can overcome a substantial budget
disadvantage or a lower number of activists. This is illustrated for the US presidential elec-
tion of 2016, in which the winner had a huge budget disadvantage and a lower number of
activists to support him.
Election campaigns are an essential component of democratic politics. They have been
1 Insidegov.com, Compare Presidential Candidates 2016, http://presidential-candidates.insidegov.
com/, retrieved August 31, 2017.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the campaign model. An illustration of the campaign model where
nodes and their corresponding edges are represented by colored circles and black lines respectively.
In this example, an A+ activist node is going to occupy an empty node O to convince B0 nodes.
The utility condition ρA#B
0 − cA > 0 in this case is, for example, fulfilled for ρA = 1 and cA = 2.
studied extensively by scholars across social sciences and political sciences, in particular, as
surveyed recently in Ref. [17]. Three characteristics from this rich body of literature are
particularly important for the construction of our model and its investigation:
1. Some voters are amenable to persuasion and opinion switching, i.e., they might be
induced to vote for either candidate if approached by a corresponding campaign ac-
tivist. In the US presidential election of 2016, the proportion of undecided voters was
estimated to be around 20% to 25% [18]. The share of persuadable voters is also large
for elections below presidential level,
2. The most effective tactics in campaigns are personal interactions between activists and
persuadable voters, such as door-to-door interaction or phone calls [19],
3. Money matters in campaigns. The benefit of campaign expenditures is positive, but
typically low and subject to rapid decay [19].
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
We consider a network with N nodes. Each node is either occupied by an individual
having an opinion A or B or it is in an unoccupied state O. The total number of nodes is
thus N = NA + NB + NO. Both campaign groups consist of political activists A
+ and B+
and persuadable individuals A0 and B0, such that NA = NA+ +NA0 and NB = NB+ +NB0 .
We illustrate the campaign model in Fig. 1. Activists have a fixed opinion and they are able
to move from their current location to unoccupied nodes to convince persuadable individuals
who do not change their location. Each campaign group is given a finite budget BA and BB
respectively, and a certain cost cA and cB, respectively, has to be paid for every attempt
at convincing a group of persuadable individuals. More specifically, an activist A+ has the
possibility to occupy an empty node O from any place in order to change with probability
ρA ∈ (0, 1] the opinion of neighboring B0 nodes. The activist A+ only moves and convinces
other B0 nodes if the utility condition ρA#B
0 − cA > 0 is fulfilled and if enough budget
BA > 0 is available. Here #B0 represents the number of neighboring nodes of the empty
node which are in state B0. If the A+ activist does move onto the empty node, independent
of the number of persuaded B0 nodes, the cost cA is deducted from the budget BA [20]. The
same applies to activists B+, however, with probability ρB, cost cB and budget BB.
From now on, we consider the fractions a = A/N , b = B/N and o = O/N of the states
A, B and O respectively. The initial values are given by a0(0), b0(0), a+(0), b+(0) and o(0).
By definition of our model, we know that only a0 and b0 change over time. Thus, a˙+ = 0,
b˙+ = 0, o˙ = 0 and thus a+(t) = a+(0), b+(t) = b+(0) and o(t) = o(0). It is now possible to
derive mean-field rate equations of a˙0(t) and b˙0(t) by assuming a perfectly mixed population
in the thermodynamic limit. Mean-field approximations have been proven useful to gain
important insights about a given spreading dynamics [21, 22], and many real-world social
networks are well described by mean-field approximations [23]. Our analytical results are
supported by stochastic kinetic Monte Carlo simulations [24, 25]. For analytical tractability,
we assume a regular network with fixed degree k, i.e. a fixed number of neighbors. A mean-
field approach for general degree distributions fk is presented in Refs. [26, 27] and is based
on an additional weighted sum accounting for different degrees in the network. We only
focus on the derivation of a˙0(t), since b0 = 1 − a+ − b+ − o − a0. Our first observation is
that the utility condition ρA#B
0 − cA > 0 corresponds to a threshold [11, 12, 26–31] in the
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sense that A+ activists only move to empty nodes whose neighborhoods contain at least⌈
cA
ρA
⌉
persuadable nodes in state B0. Here d·e denotes the ceil function since the quantity cA
ρA
might not have an integer value. We define the transition functions fA0→B0(t) and fB0→A0(t)
describing transitions A0 → B0 and B0 → A0, respectively, and find for our dynamics
a˙0(t) =fB0→A0(t)− fA0→B0(t)
=oρAΘ(BA)
k∑
j=
⌈
cA
ρA
⌉
∑
l,m.n,r∈Sk−j
j
(
k
j, l,m, n, r
)
b0
j
a+
l+1
b+
m
a0
n
or
− oρBΘ(BB)
k∑
j=
⌈
cB
ρB
⌉
∑
l,m.n,r∈Sk−j
j
(
k
j, l,m, n, r
)
a0
j
a+
l
b+
m+1
b0
n
or,
(1)
where Θ(·) denotes the Heaviside step function accounting for the fact that opinion changes
only occur when enough budget is available and
(
k
j,l,m,n,r
)
is the multinomial coefficient, such
that j+l+m+n+r = k and Sk−j = {l,m, n, r ≥ 0, l +m+ n+ r = k − j}. The prefactor o
in Eq. (1) accounts for the necessity for a node to be empty before an activist can occupy it,
and ρA, ρB denote the probabilities to persuade others, henceforth convincing probabilities.
The first double sum describes transitions B0 → A0 where at least
⌈
cA
ρA
⌉
nodes of type B0
need to be available according to the utility condition. The second term describes reverse
transitions A0 → B0. We notice that no change occurs if
⌈
cA
ρA
⌉
> k and
⌈
cB
ρB
⌉
> k. The cost
deductions from the respective budgets are described by
B˙A(t) = − cA
ρA
fB0→A0(t), (2)
B˙B(t) = − cB
ρB
fA0→B0(t), (3)
with the initial conditions BA(0) = B0A, BB(0) = B0B where B0A and B0B are the campaign
budgets of the two campaign groups, respectively. In general, our model could also be
extended to more than two campaign groups, i.e. more than two candidates. It is then
necessary to account for the additional corresponding costs, convincing probabilities and
transition functions.
In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the dynamics captured by Eq. (1) exhibits a unique
stationary solution for a given set of initial conditions. Furthermore, we show that there is
a complex interplay between the fractions of activists, convincing probabilities and costs. In
the case of ρA = ρB and cA = cB, the campaign group with the larger fraction of activists
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obtains the majority. Otherwise, different convincing probabilities and different costs lead
to a shift of the stationary states. In particular, a large convincing probability and small
cost is advantageous for the respective campaign group. Convincing probabilities cannot be
interchanged with the fractions of activists. Small convincing probabilities and large costs
lead to longer transients and to stationary states that are closer together, i.e., small gaps
between the final campaign results. Unlike the activist fractions, convincing probabilities
and costs also enter in the threshold condition. We also discuss one example in the Appendix,
which illustrates how the influence of ρ and c might, surprisingly, lead to a change in the
majority structure.
RESULTS
Budget limitations
A political campaign typically lasts a fixed time T . We assume that political campaigns
have information about the convincing probabilities ρA and ρB as well as the costs cA and
cB. A typical goal of each campaign is to convince as many people as possible by spending
the available budget in such a way that there is no money left at time T when campaigns
start at time 0. Intuitively, the amount of budget spent does not only depend on the
costs and the convincing probabilities but also on the number of activists in each campaign
group. In particular, the budget BB will be exhausted faster than budget BA if the initial
budgets, the costs and the convincing probabilities are equal but the fraction of activists
of campaign group B is larger than the one of group A. This might be problematic if the
campaign lasts longer than the time until budget exhaustion, since campaign group B will
lose its majority sooner or later. We illustrate this effect in Fig. 2 (left) where numerical
simulations are presented together with the corresponding mean-field approximation. The
finite size and the finite degree of the underlying random regular network lead to deviations
from the mean-field perfect mixing assumption. For large degrees one finds better agreement
between simulations and mean-field results [26]. Still, the simulated dynamics is qualitatively
captured by Eq. (1). To better understand the influence of budget restrictions, we now focus
on two relevant points related to the latter example: (i) we want to determine the minimum
necessary budget for given fractions of activists a+, b+ and a given campaign duration, and
6
Figure 2. Influence of budget restrictions. The time evolution of the fractions of persuadable
nodes a0(t), b0(t), activists a+(t), b+(t), empty nodes o(t) as well as the budgets BA(t) and BB(t).
The shown curves are the results of a stochastic simulation on a random regular network with
N = 105 nodes, k = 10 and the following initial conditions: a0(0) = 0.54, b0(0) = 0.01, a+(0) = 0.1,
b+(0) = 0.15 and o(0) = 0.2. The convincing probabilities are fixed to ρA = ρB = 1 and the costs
to cA = cB = 2. The thick grey curves are the numerical mean-field solutions of Eq. (2). In the
left panel, the budgets are exhausted after some time due to the small initial values BA(0) = 2
and BB(0) = 2, and thus the evolution changes. On the other hand, in the right panel, the initial
budgets BA(0) = 8.4 and BB(0) = 9.1 are chosen to be large enough not to influence the evolution
during the given time horizon.
(ii) we want to discuss strategies when to send how many activists to effectively use a given
budget so that it lasts until the campaign ends.
We begin with the discussion of point (i) and find that the minimum necessary budgets
are
BminA (T ) =
∫ T
0
cA
ρA
fB0→A0(t) dt, (4)
BminB (T ) =
∫ T
0
cB
ρB
fA0→B0(t) dt, (5)
according to Eqs. (2) and (3). To solve the integrals defined by Eqs. (4) and (5), one first
has to solve Eq. (1), assuming sufficient resources, i.e. Θ(BA) = 1 and Θ(BB) = 1 for all
times. This solution has then to be used to compute the integrals, which yields unique
solutions. We again look at Fig. 2 (left), where the initial budget BB(0) = 2 turns out to
be insufficient for a duration T = 15. What is the necessary minimum in this case? We
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Figure 3. Minimal budgets for different activist fractions. We set k = 10 and used the
following initial conditions: a0(0) = b0(0) = (1− a+ − b+ − o)/2 with o(0) = 0.2. The convincing
probabilities are fixed to ρA = ρB = 1 and the costs to cA = cB = 2. In the left panel, the minimal
budgets BminA (T ) and BminB (T ) according to Eqs. (4) and (5) are displayed as a function of the
fraction a+ for different values of b+. The black solid line indicates a given budget B = 4.5 for
campaign of duration T = 15 and the orange areas represent the corresponding regimes of possible
choices for a+ for which the given budget B suffices. The right panel shows a three-dimensional
illustration of the budget BA as a function of a+ and b+. The plane again represents a given budget
B = 4.5. All values of a+ and b+ leading to budget values below or on the plane are possible choices
to have a sufficient budget.
solve Eqs. (4) and (5) and find that the mean-field initial budgets are BminA (T ) = 8.4 and
BminB (T ) = 9.1. We clearly see in Fig. 2 (right) that these budgets are sufficient. Due to the
perfect mixing assumption, the mean-field dynamics tends to be slightly faster than the one
of the simulations.
Strategic choices of activists
For the discussion of point (ii), it is important to realize that while Eqs. (4) and (5) yield
unique minimal budgets for given a+, b+ and T , finding the two fractions of activists, for
given campaign budgets and a duration T , is not a unique operation.
Here we solely focus on choosing constant fractions of activists a+, b+ within the interval
(0, 0.3], since a+ and b+ are typically not too large. Fig. 3 (left) helps to gain some intuition
for the existence of multiple possible choices of a+ and b+ for given campaign budgets.
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We assumed equal convincing probabilities and costs. In this case, the campaign group
with the larger fraction of activists wins the campaign in the limit of long times, as shown
in the Appendix. Fig. 3 (left) shows the solutions of Eqs. (4) and (5) for a+ ∈ (0, 0.3]
and three values of b+ ∈ {0.04, 0.2, 0.3}. All solutions are parabolas with a characteristic
maximum originating from the competition between the two campaign groups. If one or
the other campaign dominates, a relatively small budget suffices due to the small average
number of opinion changes per unit of time, i.e. small transition functions in Eqs. (2) and
(3). However, if the two activist fractions are of similar size, the resulting competition
leads to a larger necessary budget due to the larger transition functions in Eqs. (2) and
(3). Considering a limited small budget, it is thus unfavorable for campaign groups to have
activist numbers facilitating strong competition. Consequently, choosing the right number
of activists is crucial for winning the election. In the more general case, one has to take the
other parameters ρA, ρB, cA and cB into account which can lead to shifted maxima.
We now want to graphically determine a tuple (a+, b+) such that a budget B given to each
campaign group suffices throughout the campaign duration. We assume a budget B = 4.5
for campaign of duration T = 15 and observe that, for example, in the case of b+ = 0.04 it
would allow for two solution branches, indicated by the orange areas in Fig. 3 (left), where
a+ > 0.27 or a+ < 0.05. In general, a given small budget restricts the possible choices
of a+ and b+ to values on or below a plane, as shown in Fig. 3 (right). If B exceeds the
maximum of the parabolas, all constellations of a+ and b+ are possible for the budgets to
be sufficient, i.e. a+, b+ ∈ (0, 1). Interestingly, in the case of a small budget leading to two
solution branches as in Fig. 3 (left), one can interpret the situation as follows. Campaign
group B, for example, takes a value of b+ = 0.3. Then group A can either send a very small
fraction or one close or equal to b+. In this case, group B would never lose, but depending
on the choice of group A, the difference between the final numbers of individuals in each
campaign group would be smaller for larger a+. However, if group B takes a smaller value
such as b+ = 0.04, campaign group A has the possibility to send a larger fraction to win
the campaign. Therefore, the decision for a certain activist fraction made by one campaign
group affects the possible choices of the other group. The right initial choice is important
for winning the election.
Next we look at the Nash equilibria of the strategic choices in the ensuing activist game
as illustrated in Fig. 3 (left). Formally, we investigate the best responses of the game defined
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by
max
BminA (T )≤4.5, b+ given
{a+}, max
BminB (T )≤4.5, a+ given
{b+}. (6)
A Nash equilibrium is a constellation (a+, b+) that solves both problems. In our example a
larger fraction of activists increases the chance of winning and we obtain three best responses
for a fixed b+ ∈ {0.04, 0.2, 0.3}
(a+, b+)b+ given = (0.3, 0.04),
(a+, b+)b+ given = (0.03, 0.2),
(a+, b+)b+ given = (0.3, 0.3).
As a consequence of the parameters and initial conditions used in Fig. 3, the tuples obey
the following symmetry: (x, y)b+ given = (y, x)a+ given. The game admits multiple equilib-
ria. Besides (0.3, 0.3), for instance, there also exists another symmetric equilibrium around
(0.044, 0.044). Moreover, two campaigns with identical parameters, clout and budget are
compatible with a constellation in which A wins with a majority. The opposite constellation
also exists, however. In practice, when the activists are not chosen simultaneously, we can
look at how a campaign group can generate a first-mover advantage by choosing a large but
still affordable number of activists that forces the other group to choose a lower number of
activists. The preceding observation suggests that in a race of two campaigns having iden-
tical parameters and budgets, the campaign wins that first has assembled the right number
of activists.
Can clout compensate a lower budget and fewer activists?
The model outlined above can be used to study political campaigns for specific parameter
environments and to address campaign regulation. As an example we illustrate an applica-
tion of the model and illustrate a phenomenon observed in the recent presidential election
in the US battleground states. Three characteristics are widely discussed. First, Donald
Trump had a significantly lower budget than Hillary Clinton 2. More precisely, he had half
of Clinton’s budget (404 versus 807 million US dollars). Second, Clinton had a higher num-
2 Insidegov.com, Compare Presidential Candidates 2016, http://presidential-candidates.insidegov.
com/, retrieved August 31, 2017.
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Figure 4. Clout versus budget and activists. The time evolution of the fractions of persuadable
voters a0(t), b0(t), activists a+(t), b+(t), empty nodes o(t) as well as the budgets BA(t) and
BB(t). The shown curves are the results of a stochastic simulation on a random regular network
with N = 105 nodes, k = 10 and the following initial conditions: a0(0) = 0.32, b0(0) = 0.205,
a+(0) = 0.175, b+(0) = 0.1 and o(0) = 0.2. The cost is set to cA = cB = 0.3. The grey curves
are the numerical mean-field solutions of Eq. (2). The left panel shows the situation where both
campaign groups have activists with ρA = ρB = 0.1. In the right panel, the convincing probability
in campaign group B has been increased to a value of ρB = 0.18, leading to a change of the majority
structure.
ber of volunteers than Trump (7% versus 4%)3. Third, Trump was able to flip millions of
white Obama supporters to his side. We thus investigate whether an advantage in terms
of clout could compensate both a significantly lower budget and a lower share of activists.
The clout is quantified through the convincing probabilities ρA and ρB. In Fig. 4 we illus-
trate a campaign situation roughly comparable to the one of the US presidential election
2016. We interpret campaign group A as the Clinton group, whereas group B represents
Trump’s campaign. We set the initial values of persuadable individuals to a0(0) = 0.32 and
b0(0) = 0.205, taking into account the initial majority structure of the actual US presidential
election 2016 poll data4. Considering the aforementioned presidential election characteris-
tics, we set a+ = 0.175, b+ = 0.1, B0A = 4, B0B = 2 to account for the different budgets and
3 Ariel Edwards-Levy, Volunteering For A Campaign Or Going To Rallies? You’re In The Minority, Huff-
post, 11.01.2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/campaign-volunteering-rallies-poll_
us_581906b8e4b0f96eba968ca7, retrieved August 31, 2017.
4 Poll Chart 2016 General Election: Trump vs. Clinton, Huffpost Pollster, http://elections.
huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-general-election-trump-vs-clinton, retrieved August 31,
2017.
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Figure 5. Poll and simulation results of the US presidential election 2016. Blue and red
curves represent the poll results for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, respectively. We compare
the poll results with our simulation (grey line) using a random regular network with N = 105
nodes, k = 10 and the following initial conditions: a0(0) = 0.32, b0(0) = 0.205, a+(0) = 0.175,
b+(0) = 0.1 and o(0) = 0.2. The cost is set to cA = cB = 0.3 and the convincing probabilities
to ρA = ρB = 0.1. The results of the simulations have been rescaled to match the initial values
of the polls and the corresponding duration. The data has been taken from http://elections.
huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-general-election-trump-vs-clinton.
numbers of activists (B0A/B0B ≈ 807/404 and a+/b+ = 7/4). Furthermore, we assume equal
costs cA = cB = 0.3 and first study the case of equal convincing probabilities ρA = ρB = 0.1,
as illustrated in Fig. 4 (left). As demonstrated in the Appendix, only the relative fraction
λ = a+/b+ matters in determining the winning campaign if the convincing probabilities
and costs are equal—campaign group A wins if λ > 1. This is the reason for our choice of
a+/b+ = 0.175/0.1 = 7/4. Clearly, the Clinton campaign group A dominates the dynamics
due to the larger fraction of activists. However, in Fig. 4 (right), we show that additional
clout can compensate a significantly lower number of activists and a lower budget. Of course,
one cannot say that Donald J. Trump won the US presidential elections only because of more
political clout. Other factors such as targeted campaigns or the sophisticated use of social
media have also been important for his success [32, 33]. The example discussed here just
illustrates the strong influence of political clout on the campaign outcome.
This observation has broader implications for the resilience of democracy, as it is related
to recent phenomena associated with populism. Candidates who promise to protect citi-
zens from unemployment or income shocks caused by disruptions due to globalization or
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automation may be able to generate sufficient clout [34]. Such candidates may win election
campaigns even if they will not be able to keep their promises or even enact detrimental
policies.
Finally, we compare the simulation results presented in Fig. 4 (left) with the US presiden-
tial election polls 2016, bearing in mind that the poll data did not reproduce the final result,
as illustrated in Fig. 5. For this comparison we rescaled the simulation results to match
the initial values of the polls and the corresponding poll duration. As outlined above, our
simulations take into account the empirically determined fractions of activists and assume
values of ρA = ρB = 0.1 and cA = cB = 0.3. It has not been possible to determine these
values empirically. Since convincing probabilities and costs are equal in this example, Clin-
ton’s campaign group wins due to the larger number of activists. We find that the simulated
poll trajectories qualitatively correspond to the actual poll data. Assuming other values of
convincing probabilities and costs would imply a different characteristic convergence time
scale and a different gap between the final campaign results as shown in the Appendix. One
would, however, still observe a qualitatively similar convergence behavior.
DISCUSSION
We have developed a novel framework to study political campaign dynamics on social
networks based on three essential features: moving activists, political clout and campaign
budgets. We illustrated how the complex interplay between these factors determines the
success of a campaign group. Our results imply that the right initial choice of the number
of activists might lead to an important advantage in winning a campaign. In addition, we
also showed that typical campaign characteristics can be taken into account by our model
allowing to apply it to the US presidential election of 2016. What is more, our model
opens up many further applications. For instance, we could introduce caps on campaign
budgets to study how such regulations impact the outcome of elections. Furthermore, our
framework allows to integrate additional channels such as media or targeting [35] which
strongly influence campaigns. Finally, by introducing preferences of citizens about policy-
making once a candidate is in office, we can identify conditions under which a politician may
win and enacts policies that will harm a majority of citizens.
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Figure 6. Time evolution and phase portrait of the campaign model. The shown curves
are a numerical solution of Eq. (1) for k = 10 with initial conditions a0(0) = 0.4, b0(0) = 0.2,
a+(0) = 0.1, b+(0) = 0.2 and o(0) = 0.1. The convincing probability is set to ρA = ρB = 0.5 and
the costs are cA = cB = 2. The left panel displays the time evolution of the fractions of persuadable
nodes a0(t), b0(t) and activists a+(t), b+(t) as well as empty nodes o(t). In the right panel, the
corresponding phase portrait is shown. Black dots represent stable fixed points.
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Appendix: Model properties
1. Uniqueness of the stationary solution
If not noted otherwise, we assume unlimited resources (Θ(BA) = 1 and Θ(BB) = 1 for all
times t) in the subsequent sections to characterize the stationary states of Eq. (1). In the
case of limited resources, the activist dynamics would just stop in one or the other campaign
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group. Is there always a unique stationary solution of Eq. (1), i.e. a unique stationary a0st and
b0st in the interval (0, a
0(0) + b0(0)]? We remember that the fractions of activists a+, b+ and
of empty nodes o are constant over time. Thus, the dynamics only applies to persuadable
nodes leading to trajectories where a0(t), b0(t) ∈ (0, a0(0) + b0(0)]. In Fig. 6 (left) we show
a typical time evolution of our dynamics. The corresponding phase portrait is illustrated in
Fig. 6 (right). We clearly see that there is only one stable fixed point for a0 and b0.
To obtain some insights into the general behavior of the stationary solutions, we simplify
Eq. (1) by solely focusing on the dynamical part of the network. More specifically, we
introduce an effective degree keff = dk(1− a+ − b+ − o)e and an effective threshold meff =⌈
c
ρ
(1− a+ − b+ − o)
⌉
, assuming ρA = ρB = ρ and cA = cB = c. Approximating Eq. (1)
by introducing an effective degree keff means to distribute the fractions a
0 and b0 of nodes
in a network with degree keff . An effective threshold meff can be seen as the consequence
of a reduced cost due to the reduced number of neighbors. We discuss the general case of
two thresholds mAeff and m
B
eff subsequently. In the following equation we interpret x as the
fraction a0 and 1− x as the fraction b0.
x˙ =
keff∑
j=meff
j
(
keff
j
)[
λ (1− x)j xkeff−j − xj (1− x)keff−j
]
, (A.1)
where λ = a+/b+. All other constant values have been neglected to increase readability and
to ensure analytical tractability. Equation (A.1) is an approximation of the time evolution of
a0 and b0 as described by Eq. (1). It is taking into account the model’s important features and
thus providing a framework to better understand the properties of the stationary solution.
We want to find out if the function has only one fixed point. Our first observation is that
the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) defined as f(x;meff , keff , λ) approaches f(x;meff , keff , λ) =
keffλ for x → 0 and f(x;meff , keff , λ) = −keff for x → 1. If the function f(x;meff , keff , λ)
monotonically decreased in x in the interval (0, 1), there would be only a unique fixed point.
For meff = 0, 1, the derivative with respect to x is given by f
′(x;meff , keff , λ) = −keff(1 +
λ) and for meff = keff the derivative is f
′(x;meff , keff , λ) = −k2eff
[
xkeff−1 + λ (1− x)keff−1
]
.
In both cases, the derivative indicates a monotonically decreasing function and thus the
existence of a unique fixed point.
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For a general threshold meff the derivative can be obtained using Mathematica [36],
f ′(x;meff , keff , λ) =− (Γ(keff + 1−meff)Γ(meff + 1))−1 keff((1− x)x)−meff−1Γ(keff)[
(1− x)2meffxkeff+1λ
(
meff(meff − 1 + x) + keff(1− x) 2F1
(
1,m− keff ; meff + 1; x− 1
x
))
+
(1− x)keff+1x2meff
(
meff(meff − x) + keffx 2F1
(
1,meff − keff ; meff + 1; x
x− 1
))]
.
(A.2)
Since x takes values in the interval (0, 1) and meff ∈ {2, . . . , keff − 1}, we only have to verify
if the hypergeometric functions 2F1 are positive. Then f
′(x;meff , keff , λ) would be negative.
Due to the fact that meff − keff < 0, the hypergeometric function takes the form [36],
2F1
(
1,meff − keff ; meff + 1; x
x− 1
)
=
keff−meff∑
n=0
(−1)n
(
keff −meff
n
)
(1)n
(meff + 1)n
(
x
x− 1
)n
,
(A.3)
where (·)n denotes the Pochhammer symbol. The last term xx−1 is smaller than 0 and thus
the terms of the sum are positive, since
2F1
(
1,meff − keff ; meff + 1; x
x− 1
)
=
keff−meff∑
n=0
(
keff −meff
n
)
(1)n
(meff + 1)n
(
x
1− x
)n
. (A.4)
The same argument applies to 2F1
(
1,meff − keff ; meff + 1; x−1x
)
. Therefore, f ′(x;meff , keff , λ) <
0 and the basic model as defined by Eq. (A.1) has one unique stationary state. We now
focus on the more general case with two thresholds, i.e. mAeff =
⌈
cA
ρA
⌉
(1 − a+ − b+ − o),
mBeff =
⌈
cB
ρB
⌉
(1 − a+ − b+ − o) and λ = (ρAa+) / (ρBb+). Thus, the resulting dynamics is
described by
x˙ =
keff∑
j=mAeff
j
(
keff
j
)
λ (1− x)j xkeff−j −
keff∑
j=mBeff
j
(
keff
j
)
xj (1− x)keff−j . (A.5)
Again, the right-hand side of Eq. (A.5) approaches f˜
(
x;mAeff ,m
B
eff , keff , λ
)
= keffλ as x → 0
and f˜
(
x;mAeff ,m
B
eff , keff , λ
)
= −keff as x → 1. In order to show that f˜
(
x;mAeff ,m
B
eff , keff , λ
)
decreases monotonically in x in the interval (0, 1), we apply the previous proof by discussing
the two cases: (i) mAeff < m
B
eff and (ii) m
A
eff > m
B
eff . We find
(i) x˙ =
keff∑
j=mAeff
j
(
keff
j
)[
λ (1− x)j xkeff−j − xj (1− x)keff−j
]
+
mBeff−1∑
j=mAeff
j
(
keff
j
)
xj (1− x)keff−j ,
(A.6)
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Figure 7. General phase portrait and skewing functions. The left panel shows the three
possible cases of the campaign model’s phase portrait where f˜
(
x;mAeff ,m
B
eff , keff , λ
)
defines the
right-hand side of Eq. (A.5). We set keff = 10, λ = 1.5 and m
A
eff = m
B
eff = 5 (blue solid line)
whereas mAeff = 5 < m
B
eff = 7 (orange solid line) and m
A
eff = 5 > m
B
eff = 0 (green solid line). In
the right panel, we define the second sums of Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7) as the skewing functions that
skew the monotonically decreasing first sums in positive (mAeff < m
B
eff) and negative (m
A
eff > m
B
eff)
y-direction, respectively.
(ii) x˙ =
keff∑
j=mBeff
j
(
keff
j
)[
λ (1− x)j xkeff−j − xj (1− x)keff−j
]
−
mAeff−1∑
j=mBeff
j
(
keff
j
)
λ (1− x)j xkeff−j.
(A.7)
The first sums in Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7) decrease monotonically in x in the interval (0, 1)
as shown above for Eq. (A.1). The second sums in Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7) approach 0 for
x = 0 and x = 1 and otherwise only have positive values in the interval (0, 1). We show two
examples of these skewing functions in Fig. 7 (right). Consequently, as shown in Fig. 7 (left),
the function defined by the first sum of Eq. (A.6) gets skewed in positive y-direction without
changing the fact that it decreases monotonically. In the case of Eq. (A.7), the skewing occurs
in negative y-direction, cf. Fig. 7 (left). Thus, there is still a unique stationary fixed point
even for general thresholds that occur due to different ρA, ρB and cA, cB.
2. Interplay between activists, convincing probabilities and cost
Intuitively, the campaign with the larger fraction of activists and the larger convincing
probability should be dominant in the stationary state. As in Sec. 1, we begin the discussion
by setting ρ = ρA = ρB, c = cA = cB. Some arguments of the model’s behavior for general
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Figure 8. Influence of activists and thresholds on the stationary states. The time evolution
of the fractions of persuadable nodes a0(t), b0(t) and activists a+(t), b+(t) as well as empty nodes
o(t) for two different parameter constellations are displayed. The shown curves are a numerical
solution of Eq. (1) for k = 10 with initial conditions a0(0) = 0.54, b0(0) = 0.01, a+(0) = 0.1,
b+(0) = 0.15 and o(0) = 0.2. In the left panel, the convincing probabilities are ρ = ρA = ρB = 1.0
and the costs are set to c = cA = cB = 2. Group B, with the larger fraction of activists, dominates
the dynamics. In the right panel, the convincing probabilities are ρA = 1.0 and ρB = 0.8, whereas
the costs are still c = cA = cB = 2. Group A
0 dominates due to the larger convincing probability.
ρA, ρB, cA, cB are given subsequently. In Fig. 6 we see that the stationary state of campaign
group B is larger than the one of group A, since b+ > a+. Can this behavior be observed
independently of the initial conditions? This would imply that only activists matter. We
illustrate a solution of Eq. (1) with a+(0) = 0.1, b+(0) = 0.15, a0(0) = 0.54, b0(0) = 0.01,
o(0) = 0.2 in Fig. 8. As in Fig. 6, we again find that the group with more activists dominates
the dynamics. We can also give some analytical insight into this behavior. For the moment,
we assume that
⌈
c
ρ
⌉
= k in Eq. (1). Then a˙ = oρk
(
a+b0
k − b+a0k
)
and the corresponding
stationary state reveals that
(
a0
b0
)k
=
(
a+
b+
)
in agreement with the expected influence of the
activists as discussed above.
For general
⌈
c
ρ
⌉
, we find that the stationary states are equal if a+ = b+ due to the
symmetric form of Eq. (1). We now assume that a+ > b+ and focus on Eq. (A.1) as before.
The equation describing the stationary state xst is given by
0 =
keff∑
j=meff
j
(
keff
j
)[
λ
(
1− xst
xst
)j
−
(
1− xst
xst
)keff−j]
. (A.8)
We know that there exists a unique solution xst ∈ (0, 1) as analytically demonstrated in
Sec. 1. The solution xst = 0.5 corresponds to the case where a
+ = b+. We now prove by
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contradiction that xst > 0.5 if a
+ > b+, i.e. λ > 1. Hence, we assume that xst < 0.5 if
λ > 1. The term 1−xst
xst
> 1 and also
∑keff
j=meff
j
(
keff
j
) [
λ
(
1−xst
xst
)j
−
(
1−xst
xst
)keff−j]
> 0, since
λ > 1. The negative terms appearing for j < keff − j are always compensated by positive
ones due to the summation over j ∈ {meff , . . . , keff}, and the sum would not add up to 0.
Thus, xst < 0.5 cannot be a stationary state corresponding to λ > 1. Consequently, x > 0.5
if a+ > b+. We conclude that the campaign with the larger fraction of activists exhibits a
dominating stationary state if convincing probability and costs are the same.
In the case of different convincing probabilities and costs, we end up with two different
effective thresholds mAeff , m
B
eff and λ = (ρAa
+) / (ρBb
+) as visible in Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7).
The discussion of the latter two equations in Sec. 1 revealed that additional sums just
skew the monotonically decreasing right-hand sides in positive (mAeff < m
B
eff) and negative
(mAeff > m
B
eff) y-direction respectively. This explains the influence of convincing probabilities
and costs on the stationary states. A skewing in positive y-direction in the case of mAeff < m
B
eff
means that the threshold mAeff =
⌈
cA
ρA
⌉
(1− a+ − b+ − o) is smaller than mBeff due to smaller
cost and a larger convincing probability. Then the skewing in positive y-direction means
that the final stationary state of campaign group A is getting larger, i.e. more individuals
follow opinion A. In the same manner, the case where mAeff > m
B
eff corresponds to a growing
influence of campaign group B. In summary, there is a complex interplay between the
fractions of activists, convincing probabilities and costs.
3. Further effects resulting from the influence of convincing probability and cost
In the previous Sec. 2, we have seen that not only the fractions of activists matter but that
a change in convincing probability and cost also shifts the stationary states to the advantage
or disadvantage of one campaign group. There are, however, other effects originating from
the influence of convincing probability and costs that shall be discussed here. To properly
analyze this influence and not to deal with too many parameters, we again set ρ = ρA = ρB
and c = cA = cB.
We first want to discuss the influence of the parameter ρ on the saturation time. The
parameter ρ corresponds to a time-rescaling, since the increment of Eq. (1), similar to x˙ =
ρf(x), comes with a prefactor ρ. Smaller values of ρ would intuitively lead to longer transient
times. Furthermore, ρ also enters the threshold condition of Eq. (1) whose summation starts
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Figure 9. Influence of costs and convincing probability. The time-evolution of the fractions
of persuadable nodes a0(t), b0(t) and activists a+(t), b+(t) as well as empty nodes o(t) is displayed.
The shown curves are a numerical solution of Eq. (1) for k = 10 with initial conditions a0(0) = 0.54,
b0(0) = 0.01, a+(0) = 0.1, b+(0) = 0.15 and o(0) = 0.2. The utility is fixed to ρ = ρA = ρB = 0.5
and the costs are c = cA = cB = 4.
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Figure 10. Characteristic timescales and opinion gap. The left panel show that a character-
istic transient time-scale tc decreases as ρ = ρA = ρB increases The gap ∆ = |b0st − a0st| between
both stationary states, however, increases with ρ. The cost is set to c = cA = cB = 1. From
the right panel, we find that the characteristic time scale tc increases with the cost c, whereas the
gap ∆ decreases with c, as illustrated in the inset. The convincing probability has been fixed to
ρ = 1. We numerically solved Eq. (1) for k = 10, with a0(0) = 0.54, b0(0) = 0.01, a+(0) = 0.1,
b+(0) = 0.15 and o(0) = 0.2.
at
⌈
c
ρ
⌉
. We remember that no dynamics occurs if
⌈
c
ρ
⌉
> k since this would imply that the
number of persuadable nodes has to be greater than the actual degree of the network. Also
in terms of the threshold condition, we would expect longer transient times for smaller values
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of ρ. Larger threshold values correspond to the situation where activists require a greater
number of persuadable nodes in order to perform an action, cf. Fig. 9. We illustrate the
dependence of a characteristic transient time-scale tc on ρ in Fig. 10 (left). In agreement with
the qualitative arguments given above, we find that tc decreases as ρ increases. Moreover,
the inset in Fig. 10 (left) shows that the gap ∆ = |b0st − a0st| between the stationary states
increases with ρ.
Similar to the effect of a small convincing probability ρ, a large cost parameter c would
intuitively lead to longer transients as shown in Fig. 9. Not all neighborhoods fulfill the
utility condition in the case of a large cost and consequently it takes more time to reach
the equilibrium. We also illustrate this behavior in Fig. 10 (right). As the cost parameter
c increases, the characteristic time-scale tc is getting larger. Moreover, we see in the inset
of Fig. 10 (right) that the gap ∆ between the two stationary opinions shrinks as the cost
increases.
The following example illustrates an interesting effect occurring as a consequence of the
shrinking gap for small values of ρ or large values of c. First, we compare Figs. 8 (left) and
S9. We find that a0st ≈ 0.235 and b0st ≈ 0.315 in Fig. 8 (left), where c = 2 and ρ = 1. These
values correspond to a gap of ∆ = 0.08. In Fig. 9 with c = 4 and ρ = 0.5 we, however,
find a smaller gap of ∆ = 0.014, since a0st ≈ 0.268 and b0st ≈ 0.282. Taking into account the
fractions of activists in both cases, i.e. a+ = 0.1 and b+ = 0.15, we conclude that 58 % are
in favor of opinion B in the first case whereas this value is reduced to 54 % in the second
case. In addition, we could think about a change of the majority structure as a consequence
of the influence of ρ and c. We assume another compartment of inactive individuals with
a fixed opinion a− and b−. They are not relevant for the dynamics at all but influence the
majority structure. We now set a− = 0.1 and b− = 0.02, thereby implicitly reducing the
value of o. As a consequence, 53 % of the individuals are in favor of opinion B in the first
case but in the second case, this campaign group loses its majority with 49 %.
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